Someone commented on one of my recent articles about yet another failure of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle fleets, citing the hydrogen fuel cell forklifts used in US distribution centers as an example. The implication is clear: if hydrogen works for forklifts, then the broader criticism of hydrogen transportation is untenable. This is a common tactic, but it's fundamentally problematic and clearly biased. I don't even consider it a well-intentioned discussion-the argument is too weak. They're just trying to find an example that sounds "concrete enough."
Using hydrogen fuel cell forklifts as evidence that "hydrogen transportation is winning" completely ignores the issue of scale; and once placed before basic statistics, this argument immediately collapses.
The core problem lies in the "denominator." Any claim of success or failure is meaningless if it only has a "numerator" and no "denominator." This isn't a debate of opinions or ideologies, but a matter of basic statistical common sense. Looking at "a few thousand units" seems impressive; but once you compare these few thousand units to "millions of similar assets," the interpretation changes completely. To continue claiming "this proves success" after such a comparison has already been presented is no longer an unintentional mistake, but rather intellectual dishonesty.
When hydrogen forklifts are used to defend hydrogen-powered transportation, only the numerator (forklifts) truly performs the "persuasive work," while the denominator (forklifts) is deliberately ignored.
Globally, the forklift market is a large and mature industrial market. According to the World Industrial Truck Statistics dataset, which has been continuously compiled over a long period, annual sales are approximately 2.2 million units. About 70% of these are battery-electric forklifts. The majority of the remainder are diesel, LPG, or CNG. Sales of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts are in the "few few thousand units per year" range. This means that hydrogen fuel cell forklifts account for far less than 0.1% of global forklift sales-therefore, even if they were included in the dataset used to generate this chart, they would hardly appear on the graph. At this scale, hydrogen is not "a niche but competitive player," but merely a statistical "rounding error." Claiming a technology's success using a share that's rounded to zero is not analysis, but narrative defense.
This point is crucial: World Industrial Truck Statistics (WITS) underestimates the overall size of the forklift market. This underestimation occurs almost entirely on the electric forklift side, not the hydrogen side. China produces and puts into use hundreds of thousands of electric forklifts annually, especially Class 3 pallet trucks and various pedestrian-operated equipment-products often excluded from export statistics, and Western datasets suffer from inconsistent data collection. In terms of electrification in material handling, China's level is far higher than North America or Europe. If these devices were fully included in the statistics, the denominator (total) of the global forklift market would expand to approximately 3 million units, and the share of electric forklifts would further increase. Hydrogen energy would not benefit from this correction; on the contrary, its relative share would be further diluted, becoming even smaller.
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Switching the focus to the US does not salvage this argument. The US market sells approximately 900,000 to 1 million forklifts annually, depending on whether the statistics are based on shipments or orders. In the US indoor logistics sector, battery-electric forklifts dominate: about 70% of annual sales are electric forklifts; while hydrogen fuel cell forklifts, after more than a decade of sales, have only reached a total of about 50,000 to 60,000 units. Internal combustion forklifts still maintain a certain share in heavier-duty and outdoor applications. Compared to the global market, hydrogen forklifts appear more "prominent" in the US, but "prominent" does not equate to "dominant." Even in the US, hydrogen forklifts represent only a small fraction of electric forklifts, and a very small fraction of all forklifts. The denominator remains important. Narrowing the scope of observation does not change the arithmetic result.
At this point, proponents of hydrogen fuel cells almost invariably turn to the same few examples: Amazon, Walmart, and Home Depot. These are the largest delivery systems in the US and are often cited as proof that "hydrogen fuel cell forklifts have won in terms of scale." Misconceptions often begin here: selective disclosure becomes crucial. The aforementioned companies, or their suppliers-such as Plug Power in the US-sometimes disclose the number of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts, but almost never the total size of their forklift fleets. This information asymmetry creates a distorted picture: when people only see the numbers, readers with preconceived notions can easily assume that hydrogen has become dominant. But this is not the case.
Walmart provides the clearest historical anchor. In 2016, Walmart disclosed that it had approximately 4,200 hydrogen fuel cell forklifts, representing about 20% of its US forklift fleet. This meant that its total forklift fleet at that time was approximately 21,000. Subsequently, according to industry media and suppliers, Walmart increased its number of hydrogen forklifts to approximately 9,500 to 10,000. What Walmart did not disclose was the current total size of its forklift fleet. Without this "denominator," the increase in the number of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts cannot be interpreted as "dominance." Even if its total fleet size has doubled since 2016, hydrogen technology will remain a minority technology within Walmart's operations.
Amazon discloses it operates over 15,000 hydrogen fuel cell forklifts in the U.S., with a target of approximately 20,000. This number sounds large, but it changes when placed in context. Amazon operates hundreds of fulfillment centers, sorting centers, and delivery sites across North America. Logistics engineering benchmarks show that a large fulfillment center typically operates with 150 to 300 forklifts on a multi-shift basis. Smaller facilities have fewer forklifts, but in greater numbers. Based on publicly available facility numbers and using a conservative estimate of the "forklift count per facility range," Amazon's total forklift fleet in the U.S. is likely in the high range of "tens of thousands." Under these conditions, hydrogen forklifts are not dominant. They are a subset, concentrated in specific facilities and specific equipment categories.
Home Depot exhibits a similar pattern, but with less information disclosure. It has been using hydrogen forklifts in some of its delivery centers since the mid-2010s. No publicly available source provides a comprehensive count of the number of hydrogen forklifts or the total number of forklifts in its U.S. operations. Estimating the fleet structure based on the number of facilities and common forklift density yields a similar result: hydrogen forklifts do exist, but are clearly secondary to battery-powered equipment. The lack of publicly disclosed totals does not imply hydrogen dominance; it simply reflects the company's standard disclosure practices.
A responsible estimation of the forklift fleet should begin with the number of facilities disclosed by the company itself. Amazon operates approximately 175 large fulfillment centers in the US, along with hundreds of smaller sorting and distribution facilities. Warehouse design and material handling studies from MHI member companies and major system integrators have repeatedly shown that a large fulfillment center operating on a multi-shift basis typically has 150 to 300 forklifts; while smaller facilities typically have 20 to 80. Taking the lower end of this range for a rough estimate: 175 large facilities multiplied by 150 forklifts equals approximately 26,000 forklifts; adding 250 smaller sites multiplied by 30 forklifts equals approximately 7,500 forklifts. Even using fairly conservative assumptions, Amazon's forklift fleet size in the US would fall between 30,000 and 40,000 units.
Walmart provides a useful cross-check because it disclosed both the number of hydrogen forklifts and their percentage of the total fleet earlier in its adoption cycle. In 2016, Walmart reported having approximately 4,200 hydrogen forklifts, representing about 20% of its US forklift fleet, implying a total fleet of approximately 21,000 units at that time. Subsequently, based on supplier disclosures and industry reports, Walmart increased its hydrogen forklift count to approximately 9,500 to 10,000 units. Even if Walmart's total forklift count has only seen modest growth since 2016, the percentage of hydrogen forklifts in the fleet would still be well below half. Any reasonable increase in the total number of forklifts would only further reduce the percentage of hydrogen forklifts.
National-level estimates of forklift ownership provide an "external ceiling" to these calculations, preventing them from becoming unrealistic. Industry estimates suggest that the total number of forklifts in use across various industries in the US is around 3 million. Assuming that Amazon, Walmart, and Home Depot operate a combined fleet of, say, 150,000 forklifts, would imply they control approximately 5% of all forklifts in the US, which is quite far-fetched. Placing their combined fleet size in the "tens of thousands" range aligns with both facility-based estimates and their disclosed numbers of hydrogen forklifts. Regardless of the estimation method used, hydrogen forklifts remain a minority technology even within the most hydrogen-friendly companies in the US.
Equally important is understanding why forklifts were once considered a "niche application" for hydrogen energy. The initial appeal had little to do with the inherent superiority of hydrogen itself, but rather was a response to the limitations of lead-acid batteries: long charging times, the need for manpower for battery swapping, and space constraints created significant operational pain points in multi-shift warehouses. Hydrogen offered faster refueling and more stable power output. This advantage did exist for a time. But it was also temporary. Lithium-ion batteries eliminated most of these constraints: fast charging, opportunity charging, lower maintenance, and continuously decreasing costs leveled off hydrogen's operational advantages. Hydrogen didn't fail because of ideology; it was overtaken by better, and certainly cheaper, electric technologies.
Direct public support for hydrogen forklifts in the United States is real and well-documented. The most explicit federal intervention came from projects under the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Fuel Cell Technology within the framework of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. DOE reports show that approximately $9.7 million in federal funding was explicitly allocated to fuel cell forklift deployment, along with approximately $11.8 million in industry cost-sharing. These projects supported the deployment of slightly fewer than 700 hydrogen fuel cell forklifts and included funding for on-site hydrogen refueling equipment, training, and data collection. On-site refueling infrastructure certainly makes fuel cell forklifts "sticky": it reduces the friction of subsequently "buying a few more hydrogen forklifts," rather than the direct adoption of battery-electric solutions by almost everyone else. Individual grants within this program include approximately $6.1 million for GENCO, approximately $1.3 million for FedEx Freight's project to deploy 35 forklifts at a single facility, and approximately $1.1 million related to Nuvera. These grants are explicitly intended to foster early market growth and mitigate first-mover risk, rather than to demonstrate commercial competitiveness without subsidies.
In addition to direct grants, hydrogen forklifts and their refueling infrastructure have also benefited from tax-based subsidies, but these are more difficult to aggregate because they are typically claimed privately by companies and only presented publicly in aggregate form. Materials from the U.S. Department of Energy and guidance from the IRS clearly indicate that fuel cells used for material handling were eligible for an investment tax credit of up to 30% of the capital cost, or up to $3,000 per kilowatt, depending on the year and project structure. Hydrogen refueling equipment may also qualify for an alternative fuel refueling tax credit under Section 30C of the Tax Code. Following recent legislative updates, the tax credit can cover up to 30% of installation costs for eligible commercial assets, but is subject to restrictions such as location and labor requirements. These incentives can significantly improve the economics of individual site projects, but there is no publicly available ledger showing the exact amount of tax credits claimed by forklift fleets, making it impossible to determine the precise total subsidy amount based solely on tax credits.
The broader hydrogen forklift ecosystem has also received indirect support through large-scale federal financing to Plug Power in the United States. This company provides most of the fuel cells, refueling equipment, and hydrogen supply for the aforementioned fleets. In 2024 and 2025, the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Loan Programs finalized a loan guarantee of approximately $1.6 billion to support Plug Power's hydrogen production and liquefaction projects. This is not a grant and is not directly targeted at forklifts, but it clearly reduces the financing risk and capital costs of the hydrogen supply network-a network that companies like Amazon and Walmart rely on forklift operations for. In summary, the record suggests that hydrogen forklifts in the US emerged and persisted in an environment of "ample subsidies"-an environment combining early deployment grants, ongoing tax credits, state-level clean fuel programs in places like California, and massive federal financial support for leading suppliers. Without access to confidential corporate tax returns, the full cumulative value of these subsidies is unknown. However, it can be stated with certainty that hydrogen forklifts did not scale without public support, and their continued use largely reflects this policy history, not just operational choices themselves.
In recent months, Plug Power's financial situation has shifted towards extreme contraction and significant cuts, directly impacting hydrogen forklift operators in the US. After receiving substantial loan guarantees from the US Department of Energy, originally intended to finance the construction of multiple hydrogen production and liquefaction facilities, the company subsequently stated it would not proceed with these projects under the loan structure. This decision reflects its ongoing liquidity pressures and considerations to avoid taking on new obligations related to long-term, capital-intensive infrastructure. Meanwhile, Plug Power has cut operating and maintenance spending, postponed projects, and shifted its focus to "preserving cash and maintaining existing customer commitments" rather than continuing to build its previously promised vertically integrated hydrogen network. As I've mentioned before, reduced investment in the maintenance of industrial hydrogen production facilities significantly increases risk. My greatest hope is that no one will be injured in yet another hydrogen-related accident (such as a deflagration or fire) and thus included in Hydrogen Insights' ever-increasing accident and injury statistics.
For operators running hydrogen forklift fleets, this "shrinkage" introduces new uncertainty. The hydrogen supply arrangements, once touted as stable, vertically integrated, and with continuously decreasing costs, now rely more heavily on third-party procurement and short-term commercial contracts. Plug Power's cost-control measures also raise questions about its resilience in providing long-term maintenance, service, and refueling support for its deployed forklift fleets. Even if day-to-day operations continue, the strategic shift itself highlights the fact that hydrogen forklifts in the US are not tied to a self-sustaining market, but rather to a financially strained supplier ecosystem. When people use hydrogen forklifts as evidence that a technology has "won," this risk profile itself becomes crucial.
What remains is more path dependence. The continued existence of hydrogen forklifts is primarily due to early infrastructure development and slower equipment upgrade cycles. But "persistence" does not equate to "validation." A technology can survive in a niche market but never achieve scale competitiveness. Mistaking "survival" for "victory" is a deeper analytical error. Forklifts are simply the clearest example because the numerical disparity is so stark and the market is sufficiently mature.
What the commenter under the previous article was doing is not hidden, and it has a specific name: base rate neglect. This is the most basic statistical error-packaging the numerator as meaningful evidence while ignoring the denominator. Pointing to "tens of thousands" of hydrogen forklifts in the US while ignoring the millions of forklifts sold globally each year and the overwhelming dominance of battery-powered devices is not analysis.
On top of this lies another logical fallacy: cherry-picking-selecting only the "geographical region and niche scenario where hydrogen is most prominent," ignoring readily available global data and the fact that electrification rates are far higher in countries like China. This behavior is driven by motivated reasoning: evidence is sifted out to defend existing beliefs, not to test them. Their habitual statistical terminology seems "knowledgeable," but their reasoning violates the most basic rules that anyone with statistical training would follow. Once the scale and benchmark have been explained, continuing to package "rounding errors" as "valid verification" is no longer a misunderstanding, but intellectual dishonesty-an attempt to convey so-called professionalism by ignoring the weight of evidence while using a "statistical" facade. This also reflects a deep-seated cognitive bias they refuse to confront, let alone overcome.
When hydrogen proponents claim data like "South Korea's hydrogen transportation sales increased by 40% year-on-year," a similar rhetoric emerges. Such figures deliberately create a sense of "conclusion," because large percentages naturally grab attention more easily. It creates the illusion of "momentum." But what's almost always missing is the base rate. If hydrogen transportation sales started from a very small base, then even a 40% increase is still negligible in the context of the overall transportation market. The reason for using percentages to "convince" is precisely because the absolute numbers aren't impressive. This involves both ignoring the base rate and being blind to the denominator, plus a "significance" technique: using a striking growth rate to crowd out the more crucial question-how large is the scale? Growth rates only truly matter when the denominator behind them is large enough to influence the system. Lacking this context, 40% growth isn't evidence of success, but rather a way to make "rounding errors" seem important.
I've discussed the irrelevance of US hydrogen forklifts to the "hydrogen transportation feasibility study" before, but I buried it in articles and comments. Now it's time to dedicate some space to clarifying it-so that next time someone tries to waste others' time on this topic, I can simply paste this article and move on to something else. As I've mentioned before, a significant portion of my published content can be explained using the XKCD comic book *Duty Calls*.
The significance of this extends beyond forklifts. The same rhetoric repeatedly appears in hydrogen buses, hydrogen trucks, hydrogen trains, and other transportation applications: a small-scale but still operational deployment is presented as evidence of "proven feasibility," while the denominator is ignored. Scale is only optional in narratives; in real energy systems, scale determines everything. Technologies that cannot overcome "rounding errors" are not morally failing, but mathematically failing. Hydrogen forklifts cannot "save" hydrogen transportation; they merely demonstrate the limitations of hydrogen transportation.
Whether it's the advocates leading the European hydrogen lobby or some oblivious commentators on the internet, anyone promoting "hydrogen as an energy route" repeatedly uses this kind of rhetoric, demonstrating a deliberate blindness to empirical facts and using logical fallacies as a "counter-attack point." Surprisingly, they succeed so frequently. Even more surprisingly, they can look in the mirror and believe in their intellectual rigor and statistical competence. Personally, I would feel extremely ashamed.
**Note from Zhongcha.com:**
The "hydrogen forklifts" mentioned in this article clearly refers to "hydrogen fuel cell forklifts/fuel cell lift trucks," meaning routes where hydrogen powers fuel cells to generate electricity, which is then driven by an electric motor, not "internal combustion engine forklifts that use hydrogen as fuel."
The basis is straightforward: the article repeatedly uses "hydrogen fuel cell forklifts" and "fuel cell lift truck deployments," and discusses on-site hydrogen refueling infrastructure, as well as the model provided by supplier Plug Power in the US, which includes "fuel cells, refueling equipment, and hydrogen." These all correspond to the fuel cell forklift ecosystem, not hydrogen internal combustion engines.
About CleanTechnica
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About the Author: Michael Barnard
Michael Barnard is a columnist for the English-language clean energy media outlet CleanTechnica, and also the founder and chief strategy officer of TFIE Strategy Inc. (The Future Is Electric Strategy). He has long served as a "climate futurist/decarbonization strategy consultant," providing electrification and emissions reduction path analysis and strategic consulting to companies and investment institutions. He frequently publishes analytical articles on low-carbon technologies, energy transition, and policy issues, with his work appearing on platforms such as Forbes. He also serves as an editor/curator for topics such as "The Future Is Electric," and his views are continuously shared through podcasts and other means. Furthermore, his profile indicates that he is based in Canada.
